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1 In Sunni Islamic theology, the prophetic institution is the object of a separate treatise,
called Nubuwwat which is here translated as prophetology.  This treatise tackles a set of
classic  issues,  as  the  definition of  prophetism,  the  possibility  or  the  necessity  of  its
existence, the demonstrations of its existence, the manner by which it operates, etc. 
2 Whether in its rationalist (kalam)  or literalist (al-aqida)  expressions,  this theology has
taken  shape  in  reaction  to  the  doctrines  and  systems  of  preexisting  and  competing
thoughts, which are either internal or external to Islam. The theologians of Islam are in
fact driven by the necessity of setting the limits on the Islamic community by identifying
the heresies, these disqualifying doctrines, which are adopted by groups or more rarely,
by individuals who cannot be taken into account among the partisans of the truth (ahl al-
haqq). Yet, if the prime objective of their treatises is to establish a doxography, namely to
present the opinions that shape the Islamic creed the criticism of religions or heretical
doctrines is so decisive that they have also been designated as heresiologies1. 
3 Thus, if we wish to understand the origins of a doctrine that is taught in this theology, it
is necessary to research its defensive or polemic aspect. This is a research conducted
within the  framework of  our  doctoral  thesis  on Sunni  prophetology.  In  this  current
article, which follows this research, we expound the discourse of five most influential
Sunni theologians about the Islamic philosophers’ thoughts on the prophetic institution.
These  thoughts  have  been  quite  controversial  among  theologians  and  have  strongly
determined the history of philosophy in the Islamic world. 
 
Barahima, Free Thinkers and Falasifa: a Typology of
Denial of the Prophetic Fact
4 The denial of Mohammad’s prophetic mission has nourished an entire literature, whose
treatises bear titles that vary on the different ideas of “proofs of prophetism” (Dala’il al-
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Nubuwwa).  It  is  difficult  to  obtain  a  precise  plan  of  these  treatises,  since  they  vary
according to the school of thought of the different authors who have tackled this issue. In
general,  the  treatises  include  two  parts:  the  first  relates  to  the  justification  of  the
prophets’ existence and responds to all deniers of the prophetic fact; the second part,
which is  often more developed,  is  devoted to  justify  the mission of  Mohammad and




5 The specialists  disagree on the origin of  this  group2.  S. Stroumsa,  who discusses free
thought in medieval Islam in a major work, regards them as a myth that has been created
by  the  Muslim  heresy  in  order  to  symbolize  the  prophecy’s  denial3.  Two  possible
hypotheses may relate to them: the first one is that their existence is a mere invention
and the second is that the group in fact existed while their doctrine is a later elaboration
that sets them up as the archetype of the prophecy’s denial. Be that as it may, they are
systematically summoned up by the theologians as soon as the latter want to illustrate
the rationalist objections to God’s actual sending of legislative prophets. The Barahima
are most often described as deists who reject any prophetic mediation between God and
His creatures and who voluntarily observe the rites if they are permissible by their ethics.
And  the  rational  arguments  that  are  attributed  to  them  converge  on  the  idea  of
sovereignty of the human reason as the intermediary between God and human beings.
 
The Free Thinkers 
6 We  are  going  to  borrow  the  expression  “free  thinkers”  from  Sarah  Stroumsa  who
dedicated a piece of work to define this category and to defend its reality. This concept is
quite convenient as it enables us to describe the authors of the different eras and of the
different perspectives, who all have in common their disproof of the prophetic fact, even
if the expression itself is not popular with the experts. 
7 S. Stroumsa maintains that free thought is  a phenomenon that is  typically Muslim, a
heresy of which the specific nature is developed in answer to the centrality of prophecy
in this religion. According to this author, there is no atheism in Islam. There are only
viewpoints that tend toward it  and free thought is the particular form of non-belief,
generated by this religion. 
8 It is important to note that her thesis rests mainly on the book of heresiography Kitab al-
Milal wa al-Nihal (The Book of Sects and Creeds) by the Ash’ari theologian Al-Shahrastani (d.
1153)  who  establishes  a  correlation  between  the  denial  of  prophetism and  personal
opinion or reason. This treatise is divided into two parts. The first discloses the doctrines
of the revealed religions: on the one hand, Islam and its 73 sects and on the other hand,
Judaism, Christianity, Mazdasim and Dualism. The second part focuses on the bearers of
the arbitrary doctrines (Ahl al-Ahwa’  wa-l-Nihal)  and includes the Indian religions,  the
Sabians,  the anti-Islamic Arabs and philosophers.  The common denominator of  these
groups is that they all follow traditions that are not based on a revelation. Shahrastani
characterizes them as Ahl al-Istibdad bi-al-ra’y, implying “those with an exclusive personal
opinion.” D. Gimaret and G. Monnot, who translated Shahrastani’s work, interpreted this
term as “free thought”, thus paving the way for S. Stroumsa4. 
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9 According  to  Shahrastani,  the  first  one  to  have  adopted  this  attitude  is  Iblis5 who
preferred to follow his own opinion rather than to obey the divine commandment. Our
heresiologist would thus qualify him as the prototype of the free thinker6. His definition
of free thinkers encompasses all the deniers of prophecies, who like other philosophers,
Sabians and Barahima, do not accept the proclaimed laws (Shara’i) but establish rules that
are based on reason (Hudud ’Aqliyya), so that observing these rules enables them to live
in society7. 
10 In Islamic thought, the two figures who seem to have left their mark with regard to the
denial of prophetism are Ibn al-Rawandi (d. between 864 and 912) and the philosopher
Abu Zakriyya al-Razi, Rhazes in Latin (d. 925 or 932)8. 
11 Regarding Ibn al-Rawandi, only few of his works have survived and the information in the
Muslim sources are contradictory. Thus, there are many unknown sides to his intellectual
biography.  Many  studies  have  tried  to  clarify  the  mystery  by  remaining  however
hypothetical, thus also resulting in contradictory views9. As S. Stroumsa points out, most
of the sources agree however on the fact that Ibn al-Rawandi devoted a work, the Kitab
al-Zummrud, to the refutation of prophetism10.
12 With regard to Abu Zakkariya al-Razi, his contempt for the prophetic institution is told in
a work that summarizes the public debate that he had with his namesake, the Ismali
theologian Abu Hatim al-Razi a Rayy (d. 934)11. The latter implies that Abu Zakariyya’s
arguments are extracted from one of his works, probably the Kitab Makhariq al-Anbiya’ (
The Book of Subterfuges of the Prophets), of which only a few fragments have survived12. 
 
The Falasifa
13 In Islamic thought the word Falasifa (sing. Faylasuf) is derived from the Greek and specifies
the ancient ones, meaning the Greek philosophers, as well as their heirs in the Islamic
world,  such  as  al-Kindi  (d. 873),  al-Farabi  (d. 950),  Avicenna  (d. 1037)  and  Averroes
(d. 1198)13. 
14 We have already mentioned two categories connected with the denial of prophetism: the
free thinkers and the Barahima, which S. Stroumsa’s typology (which draws its inspiration
from the Book of Sects and Creeds by Shahrastani) links to the Dahriya (materialistic or
eternal philosophers)14. When she tries to establish the existence of some sort of heresy,
which is specific to Islam and which does not derive from atheism but from the rejection
of prophetism, S. Strousma points out that the Falasifa were spared of the accusation of
being deniers of prophetism and thereby, of free thinking. In order to support her point
of  view,  she  states  that  by  including  the  prophetic  fact  to  the  philosophical  system
through the assimilation of the Philosopher King by Plato to the prophet of Islam, the
philosopher Farabi avoided classifying the Falasifa among the deniers of prophetism15. 
15 However,  it  might  seem that  S. Stroumsa  underestimated  the  criticism of  which the
Falasifa were subjected to by Sunni prophetology. And as we will see in a certain number
of decisive texts, these philosophers will be accused not only of maltreating the prophetic
institution by not respecting the Prophet’s authority as the supreme guide toward the
salvation in the two worlds, but also of concealing their non-belief in the exclusive nature
of the divine revelation as the path to happiness.
16 Before tackling these texts, let us specify that we distinguish between two kinds of works
that are able to formulate critical analyses against the prophetology of the Falasifa. The
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objective of the first ones is to refute the philosophy, as the Tahafut al-Falasifa by Ghazali
or the Kitab al-Musara’a by Shahrastani16, to which we associate the works of heresiology
that consider the philosophers as a political-religious category. The second kind of works
aims to establish a prophetic fact and thus, expresses criticism in order to defend this
institution against the ideas perceived as heretic and a fortiori against the deniers, as can
be seen in the case of the treatises by Kalam or by Dala’il al-Nubuwwa.
 
Al-Mawardi (d. 1058)
17 Mawardi,  the  great  theologian  and  Shafi’i  jurist  who  died  in  Baghdad  in  1058,
distinguished himself in the field of political theory, of which he is considered to be the
founder  within  Islam.  Under  the  reigns  of  the  Abbasid  Khalifs  al-Qadir
(r. 363/974-381/991) and al-Qa’im (r. 381/991-442/1031), he held the position of supreme
judge  (qadi  al-qudat)  and  proved  to  have  great  political  commitment  toward  the
authorities. Besides his voluminous treatise of Fiqh untitled Al-Hawi, Mawardi’s remaining
works focus mainly on ethics and politics. His rationalist viewpoints on theology resulted
in him being blamed and suspected of secretly belonging to the Mu’tazila movement. 
18 The only treatise of theology, for which he is known, is called A’lam al-Nubuwwah (Signs of
Prophecy) and falls within the same named kind of treatise.
19 In accordance with the method used by speculative theologians, the work begins with a
reflection on the channels of knowledge whose object is the classification of different
claims cited in the presentation17. When the author reaches the chapter dedicated to the
presentation of the prophets’ existence, he offers a listing of diverse categories of deniers
of prophetism. The first category addresses the Dahriyya (men who believe in eternity)
who glorify the world’s eternity and “deny the existence of  God and thus,  the one of  His
prophets”18.  The  second category  is  that  of  the  Barahima.  The  third  one  includes  the
philosophers who are described as follows: 
The third kind [of deniers] are the Falasifa who don’t show openly that they nullify
[the  existence]  of  prophetism  while  nullifying  it,  depending  on  what  the
examination of their written works reveals. Because they say that the Divinalia (
al-’ulum al-rabbaniya) [are obtained] after the development of disciplinary sciences (
al-’ulum  al-Riyadiyah),  such  as  philosophy  and geometry.  They  [the  Divinalia]  are
established by the one whose discipline has achieved perfection if he is open to it19. 
20 According to Mawardi, these philosophers thus claim to be able to gain access to the kind
of  knowledge  that  the  religious  faith  attributes  only  to  the  prophets.  Even  if  their
harming  of  the  prophetic  institution  is  perceptible  only  through  hermeneutics,  the
Falasifa are  portrayed  as  deniers.  However,  it  is  really  their  art  of  writing that
differentiates them from other deniers. Accusing them of concealing their true beliefs
and of making public their conformity with the religious dogma is commonplace in the
criticism of philosophy. 
 
Al-Shahrastani (d. 1153)
21 Sharhastani, a Persian theologian and historian of religions, who was born in 1086-7 in
Khorasan and died in 1153, is a major personage in the Ash’ari school. His biographers tell
of his preference for the philosophic contemplation whereas his known works are rather
The Philosophers in Sunni Prophetology
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 23 | 2012
4
rebuttals of philosophy. Because of certain aspects of his thoughts, his contemporaries
accused him of secretly adhering to the Ismaili Shi’ism20. 
22 The book that we are going to use is precisely the one that S. Stroumsa used as a starting
point in her thesis on free thought in Islam. It is a treatise of heresiology that has marked
history both by the scale of the provided wok as well as by its remarkable neutrality that
characterizes it. 
23 Before looking at Shahrastani, let us look at the study that Jean Jolivet devoted to the
“philosophers of Shahrastani”21. This study demonstrates the heresiographer’s desire to
establish a historical and doctrinal reconciliation between the prophets and a category
that is discussed in the second part of the book, namely “The Seven Pillars of Wisdom”, in
particular  Thales,  Anaxagoras,  Anaximenes,  Empedocles,  Pythagoras,  Socrates,  Plato.
Apart from the fact that this list does not correspond to the seven wise men of the Greek
tradition, each of Shahrastani’s wise men is likened to a Koranic prophet. One can read
for example that “Pythagoras was a contemporary of Solomon and drew his wisdom from
’prophecy’”.  Thus,  through  emulation,  the  prophecy’s  doctrine  circulated  toward
Socrates and Plato, attenuating gradually toward Aristotle who is excluded from it and
whom the heresiographer includes in a subsection that is completely different from the
one of the seven sages22.
24 According to Jolivet, Shahrastani’s intention was to outline a comparison between the
two historic groups of philosophers and prophets. And regarding the treatment of the
subgroups of  the philosophers  of  Islam,  in which we can find only Avicenna,  Jolivet
writes:
From a religious point of view, we could say that this Muslim [Avicenna] renounces
his Book in order follow a pagan [Aristotle] who was already a long way from the
quasi prophetic wisdom of the first Greek sages: it is therefore with good reason
that he is placed immediately before the Arabs of the Jahiliyya and the Brahmans
who have only a vague or even inexistent understanding of the prophecy […] To
evoke the pillars of wisdom in the Musara’a and the Nihaya in order to use them as
a counterpoint to “certain philosophers of Islam”, in particular, Ibn Sina, is to call
for the support of contemporaries and disciples of the ancient prophets against the
modern ones who prefer the teaching of Aristotle to the one of the Koran23.
25 Let us now look at what Shahrastani writes in the second part of his Book of Sects and
Creeds about  metaphysical  philosophers  ( Ilahiyyun),  mentioned  after  the  Eternists  (
Dahriyyun):
Others  have  a  certain  culture.  They  rise  above  the  sensible  and  recognize  the
existence of the intelligibility. Yet, they tolerate neither punishment nor orders,
neither [proclaimed] law nor conformity. They think that by obtaining clarity and
affirmation,  the world had a beginning and must return [to God] and that they
reached perfection:  their  happiness  would  thus  be  measured according to  their
understanding and their skills, their misfortune would be measured according to
their foolishness and ignorance. These are the metaphysical philosophers.
The laws and their authors are useful, so they say, for ordinary people. Punishment
and orders, what is lawful and what is prohibited, are positive matters [of law]. The
authors  of  the  Laws  possess  practical  wisdom  and  sometimes,  they  formulate
orders, establish what is lawful or prohibited, for the benefit of men and for the
prosperity of countries. Yet, what [the prophets] tell us about any reality of the
world  of  spiritual  beings  (like  the  angels,  the  sovereign  Seat,  the  Throne,  the
Guarded Tablet, the Kalamoi) is for these philosophers only an intelligible reality
that was expressed in an imaginary corporal manner,  just as [the prophets] tell
about the circumstances of the Return [to God], meaning to the [heavenly] Garden
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and the [infernal] fire. Palaces, irrigation canals, birds and fruits in the Garden are
nothing else but a stimulation of the ordinary people to wish for what their nature
yearns;  chains  and  yokes;  disgrace  and  exemplary  punishment  in  the  Fire  are
nothing else but a stimulation of the ordinary people to wish for what their nature
dreads. It is the only explanation: because one cannot conceive either shapes or
body forms in the Upper World.
This is exactly the place where [the philosophers] think best of the prophets (may
peace be upon them!).  I  don’t  mean those who drew their  knowledge from the
Niche of the Prophecy but only those [the philosophers] of Antiquity; Dahriyyah… [
wa-al-hashîshiyya]24, physicists, metaphysicists. Their judgment mislead them, they
isolated themselves in their arbitrary doctrines and their blameworthy innovations
25. 
26 Obviously, Shahrastani talks about the philosophers who live in an Islamic context since
the religious categories, denied by the latter who consider them as poetic discourse, are
quite connected to this religion. Here, prophetism is not totally invalidated but it would
be suitable only for the multitude. It should be noted that certain philosophers seem to
escape from the verdict by finding grace in the eyes of the author26. 
 
Al-Ghazali (d. 1111)
27 Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, who was an Ash’ari theologian and Shafi’i jurist, is an eminent
figure in Islamic thought. Even though he was strongly influenced by the writings of
Avicenna, he is considered to be a fierce opponent of philosophy and his name cannot be
overlooked in the study of the status of philosophy in Islam.
28 Born in 1059 in Tus, Iran, he, whom posterity called “The Proof of Islam” (Hujjat al-Islam),
provided the first  systematic refutation of  the Falsafa through his  famous Tahafut  al-
Falasifa, despite the fact that his rationalism and his inclination for Avicenna’s philosophy
caused him to be criticized for being involved in philosophy. Many researchers have tried
to clarify the complexity of his thought, in which grey areas still remain.
29 In  al-Munqidh  min  al-dalal,  the  autobiography  that  recounts  his  intellectual  journey,
Ghazali talks about his first steps toward the study of philosophy and explains that his
interest  for  this  school  was  prompted  by  his  wish  to  bring  to  light  its  deleterious
character. His assumption is that one should first be aware of the mysteries of a discipline
before criticizing it. It is thus said that he studied the peripatetic philosophy without the
help of a teacher during his free time27. 
30 It is thus in reply to the Falasifa that he composed the Tahafut al-falasifa, which discredits
twenty  of  their  doctrines,  of  which  three  impose  the  anathema  according  to  his
judgment: the denial of the resurrection of the body, the denial of God’s knowledge of
individuals,  the  eternity  of  the  world.  The  other  seventeen  issues  are  condemnable
innovations28. 
31 According to Ghazali,  the Divinalia is  the field in which the philosophers  made most
mistakes. He accuses them of wanting to obscure their heretic views by enriching their
discourses with religious categories. Thus, according to him, by means of combining their
discourses with those of the prophets and mystical thinkers, the philosophers induced
disasters, which impact the devotees of philosophy and its opponents alike. 
The Philosophers in Sunni Prophetology
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 23 | 2012
6
32 At the end of the work, when he explains why he decided to return to teaching after a
ten-year long break, Ghazali discloses the importance of the belief in prophetism within
the epistemology of Islam: 
I have noted a cooling of belief that is linked to the prophecy, to its reality and to
the practice it ordains. I have noticed how much this is widespread among human
beings. I have thought about the causes of this half-heartedness and weakening of
faith. There are four of them: the philosophers, the mystics, the Batiniyya and the
illustrious scholars29.
(…) The fifth [i.e., the philosopher] tells me:
I don’t act by simple conformism. However, I studied philosophy and perceived the
prophecy’s reality. Yet, it comes down to wisdom and benefit [of the multitude].
The religious practices that it recommends have as their sole object to discipline
the common men and women,  to  prevent  them from killing one another, from
fighting and from giving in to their wishes and desires. I am rather a wise man who
trusts  wisdom  that  turns  me  into  a  clear  sighted  [man]  who  is  free  from
conformism!
That is the height of faith for those who have studied the philosophy of the divines
and have studied the books of Avicenna and d’al-Farabi. For them, Islam is only an
outward adorning! 
We might find among them a few who read the Koran, attend communions and
prayers and exalt the revealed Law. However, they continue to drink wine and to
commit other kinds of sins and debauchery. If we asked them: “What good is there in
praying since prophecy is false?”, they would certainly answer: “It’s good gymnastics, a
local custom and it is useful for the protection of lives and properties”30. 
33 Moreover,  in  a  study  about  the  argumentation  implemented  by  Ghazali  against  the
Falasifa in his famous Tahafut al-Falasifa, F. Griffel draws our attention to another work by
Ghazali that is dedicated to the refutation of the Ismailis, the Fada’ih al-Batiniyya wa-Fada’il
al-Mustazhiriyya,  better  known  as  al-Mustazhiri and  which,  according  to  the  Islamic
scholar, is closely related to the criticism of the philosophers.31 
34 Indeed, in that book, Ghazali attacks Avicenna’s prophetology. It is true that he doesn’t
condemn  all  of  its  aspects  but  he  particularly  criticizes  its  sociopolitical  impact32,
especially the idea that the prophet addresses the multitude (’Awamm) with a picturesque
speech. A multitude that is incapable of hearing the truth about invisible things so that
the revelation will promote only itself. Even if the philosophers would not benefit from
what the revelation teaches, because they would discover it themselves by demonstration
(al-Burhan).
35 According to Ghazali, although its authors justify this theory by a search for the common
good (Maslaha), it conceals in reality a non adherence to what God passed on through the
voice of his prophet. He thus condemns this vision of revelation because it underlies that
it would be beneficial but that it does not correspond to the absolute truth. 
36 And since the truth is the first assertion of the revelation, this view of things implies
accusing the bearer of this revelation of deceit. The accusation of deceit or not telling the
truth (Takdhib) is opposed to the assent, meaning, the belief in the truthfulness of the
prophets and the sincere characteristic  of  their  revelation.  After a long deliberation,
Ghazali rules on the impiety (Kufr) of the bearers of this political view of prophecy.33 
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Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 1201)
37 Abu al-Faraj Ibn al-Jawzi is a theologist, historian and traditionalist of Hanbali obedience.
He was born between 1112 and 1114 in Bagdad. Raised into a very rich family, he became
one of the most verbose authors of Islam. His work, which has been widely published in
the Muslim world, is very fashionable in the contemporary Salafi circles today. In his
great and highly polemic work of heresiology, Talbis Iblis (The Devil’s Deceptions)34, Ibn al-
Jawzi devotes a few lines to criticism of the philosophers. Generally, he accuses them of
being  mistaken  by  following  only  their  personal  opinions  and  intellect  and  not
conforming to the prophets’ statements35. After enumerating the principal faults they are
found with, namely their denial of bodily resurrection, of the materiality of paradise, of
hell  and  of  divine  attributes  (will,  knowledge,  etc.),  Ibn  al-Jawzi  addresses  the
philosophers of Islam as follows:
Satan has thus deceived36 groups among the people of our religion through their
intelligence and penetration (Dhaka’ihim wa Fitnatihim), by indicating that the truth
(al-Sawab) consists of following the philosophers on the grounds that they are sages
who have produced discourses and acts that demonstrate perfect intelligence and
penetration, as [is witnessed] with the spread of wisdom by Socrates, Hippocrates,
Plato, Aristotle and Gallienus. They had a wealth of knowledge in geometry, logics
and Naturalia.  They discovered elements of metaphysics (Umur Khiffiyya) through
their penetration but when they talked about the Divinalia, they amalgamated them
(Khallatu) – which explains that they did differ on this [field], yet they did not differ
on the sensitive geometric [knowledge] (al-Hissiyyat wa-al-Handasiyyat) […].
They were mistaken because the human powers understand this knowledge [the
Divinalia] only in a summarized manner and yet, the source [of this knowledge] is
religion.  Furthermore,  their  disciples  were told that  these Ancients negated the
existence of the Creator and rejected the religions by regarding them as laws and
ruses (Nawamis wa-Hhiyal). They [the Falasifa] stuck to what they had been told and
refused the religious banner (Shi’ar) in that they neglected to pray and indulged in
interdictions […]. The Jews and the Christians can be pardoned more than them
since they observe religions that are established by miracles; and the innovators (al-
Mubtadi’a fi al-Din) can be pardoned more than them since they preach reflection on
arguments (al-Nazar fi  al-Adilla).  Whereas they (the Falasifa)  may have had other
reasons  for  being  impious  (Kufrihim)  than  just  knowing  that  the  [ancient]
philosophers were sages and mind you, they ignored the fact that the prophets
were sages and much more.
[…] We have seen philosophers (Mutafalsifa) of our community whose philosophism
(al-Tafalsuf) generated only perplexity, [and consequently,] they conformed neither
to philosophism nor to Islam. Some of them fasted [on the month] of Ramadan and
prayed and then, began to deny the Creator and prophetism (al-i’Tirad ’ala al-Khaliq
wa-l-Nuburwwat)37.
38 The Falasifa are thus accused of sinning by substituting the prophets’ authority with the
authority of the ancient philosophers. As Ghazali also states, this leads them to shirk
ritual practices by viewing the revelation as a mere legal code, or even worse, as a ruse.
Some of the philosophers aren’t consistent and do observe the religious rites but disprove
of  prophetism.  Finally,  according  to  Ibn  al-Jawzi,  apart  from  their  impiety,  the
philosophers of Islam have a servile attitude. 
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Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) 
39 Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah was born in 1263 in the city of Harran, one of the
strongholds of Hellenistic philosophy, into a well-known family of Hanbali jurists. His
biographers are unanimous in praising his intellectual qualities, in particular his unusual
renowned ability to memorize facts. 
40 This  outstanding  theologian,  jurist  and  polemicist  is  considered  to  be  the  supreme
authority of contemporary Salafites.  His bibliography is impressive, it contains a large
amount of works dedicated to the traditional religious genres (jurisprudence, theology,
exegesis) and polemic works, of which most are devoted to the refutation of theology, of
speculative Sufism and of philosophy. 
41 Ibn  Taymiyyah,  who  had  an  extensive  knowledge  of  Avicennian  philosophy  and  of
speculative theology, devoted an important part of his work to criticizing the Greek logic,
the metaphysics of the Falasifa and their Divinalia in particular.
42 The Falasifa, whom he regards as godless, are one of his favorite targets. For example,
quoting Al-Kindi, whom he describes to be an Islamic philosopher (Faylasuf al-Islam), he
hastens to rectify:  “The point I  want to make – the philosopher that can be found in Islam
– because the philosophers are not part of the Muslims”38. 
43 Ibn  Taymiyyah  says  that  the  philosophers  have  an  intellectual  superiority  complex,
which he especially condemns when they confront the prophets. According to him, some
of them openly give preeminence to the philosophers over the prophets when it comes to
theoretical knowledge39. They thus dare to invalidate the Divine revelation as a source of
knowledge. 
44 However, Ibn Taymiyyah distinguishes between the philosophers for whom the prophets
disclosed facts that are contrary to the truth in order to preserve the social peace, and
those who considered the prophets  to  be  ignorant  “who didn’t  know [that  they  taught
untruths] because their perfection lies in practical abilities (al-Quwwa al-’Amaliyya) and not in
theoretical abilities (al-Nazariyya)”40. According to our author, the first ones teach that it is
in the interest (Maslaha) of the crowd that we address it as if this were the way things are
even if it is a lie, in which case the lie would benefit the crowd because there would be no
other means to guide it toward the path to salvation but the one to educate it by way of
symbols. 
Avicenna and his  fellow men developed their  rule  [of  the interpretation of  the
revelation]  on  the  basis  of  this  principle,  as  can  be  seen  in  the  law  that  he
formulated in his  Risala  al-Adhawiyya41.  These people say that the prophets used
these words with the intent [of seizing] the apparent meaning (Zawahiruha) so that
the crowd would be able to understand this meaning, even if these appearances in
themselves are false and contrary to the truth. Their aim was to tell the crowds lies
and vane things for the crowds’ benefit42.
45 Ibn Taymiyyah discredits the philosophers not only because they view the temporal role
of the prophets as mere political governance but also because the philosophers introduce
prophecy in their emanationist view of the world, and because of the consequences of
their theory according to which God doesn’t know individuals: 
According  to  them,  God  will  not  recognize  Moses  as  a  person,  neither  will  he
recognize Jesus or Muhammad nor anyone else from this world; not to mention His
ignorance of details on what took place on the day [of the battles] of Badr, Uhud or
The Philosophers in Sunni Prophetology
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 23 | 2012
9
Ahzab in all the events, which He described in the Koran. They [the Falasifa] decreed
that the prophecy is one [thing that] can be attained; it would be an emanation that
pours onto the soul of the prophet when it is ready; those who prepare their souls
will be able to receive this emanation. […] this insult toward the prophets is worse
than the speeches of the godless falsifiers among the Jews and Christians [...]43.
46 By virtue of their theory, he continues, some of these philosophers go so far as to say that
the purpose of the prayer is not to worship God since, according to their principles, God
doesn’t  recognize the individuals  and would not  be able  to  distinguish an observant
person from a non-observant person44.  Sometimes,  they will  maintain that  the ritual
practices (al-’ibadat) serve to polish the soul in order to prepare it for knowledge; or, they
might teach that the purpose of the practices is “to find happiness at one’s home and in one’s
town [and] this is what they call practical wisdom (al-Hikma al-’amaliyya)”. The philosophers
don’t impose religious practices to those who have reached the truth of knowledge (
Haqiqatu al-’ilm)45, as they maintain. Some of them may add that “the prophets also weren’t
obliged to engage in these practices but they fulfilled them because this validated their revelations
to  the  communities  by  guiding  them  and  not  because  it  was  an  obligation  for  them.”46.  In
response to this last accusation, Ibn Taymiyyah feels that if a person is permitted to skip
prayers in certain situations provided by the law in accordance with the unanimous
agreement from the community’s scholars, preaching that the philosophers themselves
are exempt from them is inacceptable. As they are seen as apostates, he decides that
these people are liable to the death penalty if they strop praying47. 
 
Conclusion
47 The foregoing shows quite clearly that the philosophers of Islam are considered to be
deniers of prophetism. They don’t symbolize the outright rejection of this institution,
following the examples of the Barahima or even the Eternists (Dahriyya), but as soon as the
heresiologist  or the sworn enemy of  philosophy addresses their  prophetologies more
comprehensively than just a simple scholastic paper, the philosophers are accused in the
same manner as the other deniers48. 
48 Based on the texts that we have discussed, we are able to identify quite a lot of criticism
toward them, which relates to prophetism: 
49 First, they are accused of substituting the authority of the ancient philosophers for that
of the prophets. They are not accused of being atheists but, like the Barahima who prefer
rationalism  over  the  prophetic  revelation,  they  are  also  guilty  of  a  crime  of  lese-
prophecy.
50 Second, the Falasifa are suspected of competing with the prophets within the city, in the
fields  of  government  and  knowledge.  They  see  intellectual  wisdom  as  the  path  to
happiness, therefore, they believe that religion is valuable only to the uneducated masses
who cannot find their way to salvation through any other path. In the same vein, they are
accused of evading religious practices on the ground that their salvation does not depend
on them. Thus, the philosophers see in religion only its legal aspect, which excludes any
difference between the divine law and the natural law. In conclusion, the theologians
perceive the philosophers, including those of Islam, the Falasifa, as a competing group in
the political arena.
51 Finally,  by  trying  to  hide  their  non-adherence  to  the  prophetology  of  Islam  and
consequently, to the Islamic religion; by concealing their philosophical opinions behind
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NOTES
1. In order to illustrate this phenomenon, Louis Gardet characterized this theology as defensive
apology; an expression whose use is today part of the professional vocabulary of experts on this
subject. 
2. P. Kraus asserts that everything we know about them comes from Kitab al-Zummrud by Ibn al-
Rawandi,  which  is  the  first  source  where  they  are  mentioned  for  their  denial  of  prophesy.
According to him, Ibn al-Rawandi invented them in order to show his own doctrines. Certain
specialists have even alluded to a copying error, meaning that Barahima should in fact have been
Ibrahimiyya, referring to descendants of Abraham who were nothing else but a Sabian sect, cf.
Stroumsa, S.,  Freethinkers  of  Medieval  Islam,  Ibn  al-Rawandi,  Abu Bakr  al-Razi  and  their  Impact  on
Islamic Thought, Leyde, Brill, 1999, p. 145-6. 
3. “It could be interpreted as another proof for the late, fictious nature of the Barahima”, Stroumsa, op. cit
., p. 24, n. 25.
4. See the introduction to the French translation of D. Gimaret, Livre des religions et des sectes,
p. 13. S. Stroumsa admits that the borrowing of the expression “free thought” to the context in
which  it  developed,  namely,  the  intellectual  history  of  modern  Europe,  is  problematic.  Yet,
Stroumsa justifies her choice by claiming that the phenomenon of deism in the European school
of thought offers a parallel that is related to the free thinkers of Islam, cf.  Stroumsa,  op.  cit., 
p. 7-8.
5. Koranic name that refers to Satan. 
6. Cf. Shahrastani, The Book of Sects and Creeds, transl. Gimaret, D., Monnot, G., t. 1, p. 115. 
7. Id., t. 1 p. 160-1.
8. These  two  individuals,  who  have  not  attended  the  school,  earned  the  epithets  of  “free
thinkers” or “freethinking individuals” respectively in the works of D. Urvoy and S. Stroumsa for
their original viewpoint with regard to official Islam. Cf. Urvoy, D., Les penseurs libres dans l’Islam
classique, p. 117-132, and Stroumsa, S., op. cit. p. 45.
9. Ibid. 
10. We should also refer to the Kitab al-Intisar by Mu’tazilah al-Khayat (d. 913) in order to learn
that “the book that is  known as the Kitab al-Zummrud,  where he [Ibn al-Rawandi]  stated the
miracles of the prophets, may peace be upon them, just as the miracles of Abraham, Moses, Jesus
and Muhammad, may God bless them. He refuted the reality of these miracles and maintained
that  these were only subterfuges  (makhariq)  and that  people  who had performed them were
magicians and liars”. Cf. Al-Khayat, Abu l-Husayn, Kitab al-Intisar, ed. and transl. A. Nader, Beirut,
1957, p. 12.
11. Cf. A‘lam al–Nubuwwa, ed. S. Sawy, Teheran, 1977. 
12. Parts that show the main arguments of the critical analysis of Abu Zakariya’s prophetism by
Abu Hatim are translated by F. Brion in the Bulletin of Medieval Philosophy, n 28, 1986, p. 135-62 and
in the Revue philosophique de Louvain, n 86, 1989, p. 139-164.
13. We should take into consideration that most of the time, the philosophy’s opponents borrow
the  form  Mutafalsifa,  meaning  “philosophizers”,  which  we  sometimes  translate  as  “alleged
philosophers” or “pseudo-philosophers”, which is better suited for the critical context, where
they are usually mentioned. 
14. That the polemists traditionally single out as the “divines” (al-Ilahiyyun). Jolivet translates
Dahriyyun as “physicians”, cf. The Book of Sects… t. II, p. 92.
15. “It thus seems that, from the time of Farabi on, the prophetology of the Falasifa immunized
them to the suspicion of  freethinking.  Once the Falasifa,  at  the forefront of  rationalism,  had
integrated  prophecy  into  their  thought,  the  accusation  of  freethinking  would  become
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increasingly similar to that of atheism: the philosophers’ doctrine was said to be like denying
prophecy, or it amounted to denying prophecy. The Falasifa did not profess real, open and blatant
freethinking, and they were not accused of professing it”. Stroumsa, op. cit., p. 192.
16. Which is a refutation of Avicenna’s metaphysics. (Ed., transl. and notes by Madelung, W. and
Mayer, W., London, 2001). 
17. Mawardi’s work includes rational arguments that are not founded on the sources of authority
and  thus,  the  work  distinguishes  itself  from  treatises  by  traditional  theologians  whose
demonstration of the prophets’ existence is based only on the Koran and on prophetic traditions.
18. Cf. al-Mawardi, A‘lam al-nubuwwa, p. 66.
19. Id., p. 66-7. Mawardi was probably referring to an opinion expressed by al-Farabi (d. 950), the
founder  of  the  political  philosophy  on  Islamic  land.  An  opinion  according  to  which  gaining
theoretic knowledge, to which the Divinalia belong, can be realized only through revelation. Cf.
Al-Farabi, Abu Nasr, al-Fusul al-Madani, ed., intro. and English transl. by D. M. Dunlop, Cambridge,
1961, p. 167. 
20. A  hypothesis  that  is  strongly  supported  by  contemporary  studies.  Cf.  Monnot,  Art
“Shahrastanî” EI², Vol. IX, p. 214-216. Brill, Leiden. 1997. 
21. Cf. Jolivet, J., “The Philosophers of Shahrastani” in the Book of Sects and Creeds, transl. intro.
and notes by J. Jolivet, and G. Monnot, t. II, p. 14-51.
22. Id., p. 17.
23. Id., p. 46.
24. Featuring  thus  in  certain  sources,  the  work  poses  a  problem  to  the  translators,  cf.
Shahrastani, The Book of Sects …, t. II, transl. Jolivet et Monnot, note 15, p. 93.
25. Id., pp. 92-93. As we have seen, S. Stroumsa follows Gimaret by translating al-Istibdad bi al-ra’y
in  Shahrastani  by  “free  thought”.  However,  according  to  heresiography,  the  philosophers  of
Islam are truly included in this category. Even more so, let us emphasize the symbolic impact of
Avicenna’s treatment in the same way as the pagan Arabs.
26. We cannot say exactly about which philosophers the author thinks, given that in this work,
all renowned Falasifa are considered in the category of the followers of free thought, which is
outside of the Muslim community. 
27. Al-Ghazali, Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal, transl. F. Jabre, Beirut, 1969, p. 18.
28. Id., pp. 23-24.
29. Id., p. 47. 
30. Id., pp. 47-48. Translation by F. Jabre, modified by us.
31. Cf.  Griffel, F.,  “Taqlid of  the  Philosophers.  Al-Ghazalî’s  initial  accusation  in  the  Tahafut ” 
Insights into Arabic Literature and Islam. Ideas, Concepts, Modes of Portrayal, ed. Sebastian Günther,
Brill, Leyde, 2005, p. 118. 
32. Cf.  al-Ghazalî,  Fada’ih  al-Batiniyya  wa-Fada’il  al-Mustazhiriyya ,  ed.  Badawi, A.,  Cairo,  1964,
p. 146-168.
33. Id., p. 153.
34. Ibn al-Jawzi, Abu al-Faraj, Taliis Iblis, Kairo, al-Tawfiqiyya. 
35. Talbis, p. 60.
36. According to the phrase that introduces every group, opinion or critical act in the work.
37. Id., p. 64-65.
38. “ A‘ni  al-Faylasuf  al-Ladhi  fi  al-Islam  wa-illa  fa-Laysa  al-Falasifa  min  al-Muslimin”,  cf.  Ibn
Taymiyyah, Kitab al-radd ‘ala al-Mantiqiyyin (The Refutation of the Greek Logicians), Bombay, 1949,
p. 199.
39. Id., p. 183.
40. Id. p. 140; and Ibn Taymiyyah, Dar’ ta‘arud al-‘aql wa-l-naql, Vol. 1, ed. M. R. Salim, Riad, 1979,
pp. 8-11. 
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41. Cf. Michot, Y., “A Mamluk theologian’s commentary on Avicenna’s Risala Adhawiyya. Being a
translation of a part of the Dar’ al-ta‘arud of Ibn Taymiyyah, with introduction, annotation and
appendices” Journal of Islamic Studies, (2003) 14 (ii) pp. 149-203 and 14 (iii) pp. 309-363.
42. Cf., Ibn Taymiyyah, Dar’, Vol. 1, pp. 8-9.
43. Cf. Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Radd, p. 277.
44. Id., p. 461. 
45. Cf. Ibn Taymiyyah, Dar’, Vol 2, p. 269
46. Ibid. 
47. Id., p. 270. 
48. The scholastic papers often content themselves with quoting from the Barahima in order to
illustrate the rejection of prophetism.
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The present article relates to the philosophers of Islam in Sunni prophetology. The prophetic set-
up in theology meets the rationalist objections of the various deniers of this institution, which is
fundamental to the Islamic religion. The deniers include the philosophers who attempted to find
a sense in this institution with regard to the political philosophy and to the theory of knowledge
acquired from their Greek predecessors. In this study, we will demonstrate that this attempt at
reconciliation  between  religion  and  philosophy  has  in  all  likelihood  not  convinced  the
theologians. 
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